This study investigates, on the basis of a unique combination of two large-scale data sets, how rent sharing interacts with the gender wage gap in the Belgian private sector. Empirical findings show that individual gross hourly wages are significantly and positively related to firm profits-per-employee even when controlling for group effects in the residuals, individual and firm characteristics, industry wage differentials and endogeneity of profits.
Introduction
Since Becker's (1957) seminal paper on the economics of discrimination, studies on the magnitude and sources of the gender wage gap have proliferated (e.g. Blau and Kahn, 2000) .
Numerous studies have in particular focused on the relationship between labour market segregation and the gender wage differential (e.g. Carrington and Troske, 1998; Fields and Wolff, 1995; Groshen, 1991; MacPherson and Hirsh, 1995; Rycx and Tojerow, 2002) . These papers examine basically to what extent the observed sex wage gap can be explained by occupational and sectoral segregation. Although the evidence is still inconclusive, these studies show that a large fraction of the gender wage gap is accounted for by segregation of women in lower-paying occupations, industries, and occupations within establishments.
Nevertheless, in contrast to previous research, Bayard et al. (1999) suggest that a substantial part of the sex wage gap remains attributable to the individual's sex.
Besides, there is a growing literature, essentially concentrated on the Anglo-Saxon countries, showing that firms share rents with their employees (e.g. Abowd, 1989; Abowd and Lemieux, 1993; Blanchflower et al. 1996; Carruth and Oswald, 1989; Christophides and Oswald, 1992; Denny and Machin, 1991; Hildreth and Oswald, 1997; Van Reenen,1996) . In other words, recent findings suggest that ceteris paribus profitable firms pay higher wages to their employees. For Britain, Canada and the US, the estimated elasticities between wages and profits-per-employee range between 0.04 and 0.2, depending on the quality of instruments used to control for the endogeneity of profits. Notice that weak instrumenting biases downward the effect of profits on worker's wages. Results for continental Europe, although not very numerous, tend in the same direction. For example, using Swedish matched worker-firm data for 1981 , Arai (2001 reports that the elasticity of wages with respect to profits-per-employee is of the magnitude 0.01. The existence of rent sharing has also been examined in France and Norway by Margolis and Salvanes (2001) on the basis of linked employer-employee panel data. Considering a large number of statistical and economic explanations, the authors find that the estimated coefficient on profits is not significant in France, while it is small but statistically different from zero in Norway.
Nevertheless, let us notice that, using a large cross-section of French manufacturing workers, Fakhfakh and FitzRoy (2002) report a significant wage-profit elasticity of between 0.01 and 0.02.
In sum, there is strong evidence supporting that workers' wages depend upon the firms' ability to pay. Yet, very little is known about: (i) the relative magnitude of the payprofit elasticity for male and female workers, and (ii) the contribution of rent sharing to the overall gender wage gap. Recent findings (e.g. Arai and Heyman (2001) ; Fakhfakh and FitzRoy, 2002) suggest, however, that the relationship between wages and profits is not neutral with respect to gender. For exemple, using a large Swedish matched employeremployee data set for , Nekby (2002 finds that the wage-profit elasticity is about 30 to 60% lower for women than for men. The author also shows that gender differences in rent sharing account for less than 2% of the overall gender wage gap.
The objective of this paper is to examine the interaction between rent sharing and the gender wage gap in the Belgian private sector. The current evidence regarding the level and sources of the gender wage gap in Belgium is still far incomplete. Jepsen (2001) shows, on the basis of the 1994 and 1995 Panel Study of Belgian Households (PSBH) , that the sex wage gap between full-time workers stands at around 15% and that only a very small part of it can be explained by gender differences in endowments. In contrast, using the 1995 Plasman et al. (2001) suggest that the wage gap between (all) men and women working in the Belgian private sector reaches almost 22% and that half of it is attributable to gender differences in working conditions, individual and firm characteristics. Moreover, while the existence of rent sharing has been recently highlighted for Belgium by Goos and Konings (2001) , its impact on the gender pay differential is still unknown.
Structure of Earnings Survey,
The present paper aims to partially fill this gap by investigating, on the basis of a unique combination of two large-scale, matched employer-employee data sets (i.e. the Structure of Earnings Survey and the Structure of Business Survey), how rent sharing interacts with the gender wage gap in the Belgian private sector. To do so, we first investigate how individual gross hourly wages are related to firm profits-per-employee when controlling for group effects in the residuals, individual and firm characteristics (e.g. education, prior experience, tenure, sex, occupation, region, autonomy at work, type of contract, firm size, level of wage bargaining), industry wage differentials (Nace 3-digit level) and endogeneity of profits. Secondly, we examine whether these results vary for men and women. Finally, we analyse, on the basis of the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition technique, what proportion of the overall gender wage gap can be attributed to: (i) gender differences in mean profit levels of employing firms, (ii) differences between wage-profit elasticities for men and women, and (iii) differences by gender in all other factors, i.e. intercepts, working conditions, individual and firm characteristics.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data set and the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Framework
Two models have become standard in the literature for the analysis of the impact of profitsper-employee on wages in a bargaining framework. These are the right-to-manage and the efficient bargaining models, so-named respectively by Nickell and Andrews (1983) and McDonald and Solow (1981) . In the right-to-manage model, firms unilaterally determine employment, while wages are the result of a confrontation between the objectives of the firm and of the employees. In the efficient bargaining model, bargaining takes place with respect to both employment and wages. While both models yield identical wage equations, they differ fundamentally in that in the former employment is endogenous with respect to wages whereas in the latter it is exogenous. Nevertheless, they both suggest that wages are related to the firm's ability to pay, i.e. to the firm's profitability [1] .
In this paper, we rely on the right-to-manage model [2] . Hence, suppose a bargaining situation where a firm's real profit function is given by:
with Π the real profits, R(L) the real revenue, W the real wage and L the employment level.
Also consider a risk-neutral group of workers, not necessarily a union, which attempts to maximize the expected utility of a representative member, defined as:
with N the number of members in the group (0 < L ≤ N) and A the outside option (W > A).
The outside option is the expected value of real revenue perceived by an individual in the event of redundancy. It depends positively on the unemployment benefit and on the expected real wage that a worker would obtain elsewhere, and negatively on the unemployment rate.
The model is solved backwards: the profit-maximizing firm determines the employment level, given the bargained wage in the first stage of the game. The resulting deal is represented by the maximisation of the generalised Nash bargain. This approach boils down to maximising the weighted product of both parties' net gain, i.e. the difference between levels of utility in the event of an agreement and in the event of no agreement. For a company, without fixed costs, the level of utility reached when bargaining fails equals zero.
Indeed, since we assume that all workers are affiliated to the group, the company will have to cease production if agreement is not reached. The fallback position of a representative member of the group is equal to A. Accordingly, the generalised Nash bargaining problem can be written as follows [3] : 
Expression (4) suggests that real wages are affected by the outside option, real profits-peremployee and the relative bargaining power of the workers.
The corresponding statistical specification, which will serve as a benchmark for our empirical analysis, can be written as follows:
with W i the logarithm of the gross hourly wage of the individual i (i=1,…, N); UR s the logarithm of the unemployment rate in sector s; SW s the logarithm of the average individual gross hourly wage in sector s; (Π/L) f the logarithm of the profits-per-worker in firm f; δ 0 ; δ 1 , δ 2 and λ are the parameters to be estimated and ε i is a white noise error term. UR s and SW s reflect the outside option of a representative worker and (Π/L) f captures the firm's good fortune. According to bargaining theory, an increase in the outside option of a representative worker reduces wage moderation. Therefore we expect a negative sign for δ 1 and a positive sign for δ 2 . The intuition behind this is that when the sector unemployment rate diminishes, the probability of finding a job elsewhere goes up and therefore wage claims increase. In contrast, a drop in the expected alternative wage mitigates envy effects and wage claims. λ measures the relative bargaining power of the workers. The sign of the latter is expected to be positive and some theories suggest that its magnitude may be different for men and women.
According to the theoretical model developed by Sap (1993) , gender differences in λ's may appear if the bargaining position of the union is mainly reflective of the male workers' interests. In other words, the biased composition of the union may generate a more favourable bargaining outcome for men. At the individual bargaining level, differences in rent sharing can also arise if men are more proficient than women at bargaining over wages (Nekby, 2002) . Finally, differences in λ's can be explained by the fact that male workers are more present in capital-intensive firms. This explanation, based on Katz and Summers (1989) argument, implies that workers in higher capital-intensive industries have more power to extort rents during wage bargaining.
Description of the Data
The present study is based upon a unique combination of two large-scale data sets. The first, carried out by Statistics Belgium, is the 1995 Structure of Earnings Survey (SES). It covers the Belgian establishments employing at least 10 workers and whose economic activities fall within sections C to K of the Nace Rev.1 nomenclature [4] . The survey contains a wealth of information, provided by the management of the establishments, both on the characteristics of the latter (e.g. sector of activity, region, size of the establishment, level of wage bargaining) and on the individuals working there (e.g. education, potential experience, seniority, gross hourly wages, bonuses, number of working hours paid, gender, occupation).
Unfortunately, it provides no financial information. Therefore, the SES has been merged with the 1995 Structure of Business Survey (SBS). It is a firm-level survey, conducted by Statistics Belgium, whose coverage differs from the SES in that it includes neither the financial sector (Nace J) nor the establishments with less then 20 employees. The SBS provides firm-level information on financial variables such as sales, value added, value of production, gross operating surplus and value of acquired goods and services. The final sample, combining both data sets, covers 34,972 individuals working for 1,501 firms. It is representative of all firms employing at least 20 workers within sections C to K of the Nace Rev.1 nomenclature, with the exception of the financial sector.
[Take in Table I] Table I sets out the means (standard deviations) of selected variables for the overall sample as well as for men and women. We note a clear-cut difference between the average characteristics of male and female workers. The point is that on average men earn significantly higher wages, are employed in larger firms where profits-per-capita are higher, work a larger number of (paid) hours, and have more (potential) experience and seniority.
Also noteworthy is that while the average sectoral unemployment rate is smaller for men, the average sectoral wage is less important for women. Finally, Table I shows that the proportion of workers being paid a bonus for overtime or shift work, night work and/or weekend work is significantly larger among men (see Appendix I for a more detailed description).
Empirical Analysis
In the remainder of this paper, we investigate the existence and the magnitude of rent sharing in the Belgian private sector. Our estimation strategy is as follows. First, we present simple OLS estimates for our benchmark specification, i.e. equation (5). Next, we consider the possibility of group effects in the covariance matrix, which might bias the estimated standard errors towards zero. Thirdly, we control for industry wage differentials and a wide range of observable individual and firm characteristics. Fourthly, we instrument profits-per-worker since by construction they are endogenous. Finally, we estimate our model separately for men and women, and we use the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition technique in order to determine what proportion of the overall gender wage gap is due profit effects. Table II summarizes the different stages of our empirical analysis.
[Take in Table II] 
Benchmark Specification
Our first model (see Table II ) serves as a benchmark for our analysis. In this basic model, we regress the logarithm of the individual gross hourly wages on the logarithms of the sector unemployment rate, the sector average gross hourly wage and the firm profits-per-worker. This is done by using OLS with White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors.
As shown in the first column of Table III, all the coefficients have the expected sign and they are significant at the 1% level, both in individual terms and globally. Our estimate of λ, i.e. the elasticity between wages and profits-per-worker, is 0.074. This means that on average a doubling of profits-per-worker increases earnings by 7.4%. To evaluate the impact of profits on the distribution of wages, Lester's (1952) range of pay due to rent sharing can be calculated. This statistic estimates the fraction of the overall wage inequality that is due to the variability in profits-per-worker. It is obtained by applying the following formula:
where λˆ is the estimated wage-profit elasticity, X measures the level of firm profits-perworker, and σ(X) and X denote the standard deviation and the mean value of X, respectively. On the basis of this formula, it appears that about 48% of the variance in individual wages is due to the variability in profits [5] . To put it another way, given that the mean hourly wage stands at BEF 543, rent sharing explains the variation of wages between BEF 284 and BEF 802 [6] .
[Take in Table III] Our benchmark regression clearly supports the hypothesis that individual wages are significantly and positively related to the firm's ability to pay. Nevertheless, caution is required. Indeed, the explanatory power of Model 1 is limited. The adjusted R² reaches only 0.21. Moreover, results might suffer from various econometric problems, e.g. group effects in the residuals, omitted variable biases, endogeneity of profits. In the next sections, we will therefore try to improve the robustness of our model by controlling for these statistical issues.
Group Effects
The first potential trap derives from the simultaneous use of grouped observations and individual data. Indeed, the presence of aggregate explanatory variables in Model 1 can bias the estimated standard errors and as a result distorts the significance of our coefficients. To account for these group effects, Model 2 applies the correction for common variance components within groups, as suggested by Greenwald (1983) and Moulton (1990) . This correction transforms the covariance matrix of the errors, but leaves the point estimates and the determination coefficient unaffected. Therefore, our second model has the same estimated coefficients than our benchmark model, but different t-statistics. Findings, reported in column (2) of Table III , clearly support the overestimation phenomenon demonstrated by Moulton (1990) . However, all regression coefficients, except that of unemployment, remain significant at the 1% level. Therefore, it appears that the positive and significant relationship between wages and profits can not be attributed to group effects [7] .
Individual and Firm Characteristics
The omitted variable bias is another important issue that has to be investigated. According to the standard Walrasian (competitive) model of the labour market, where the equilibrium wage is determined through marginal productivity, two agents with identical productive characteristics necessarily receive the same wages. However, so-called compensating differences may occur between similar individuals placed in different working conditions. Indeed, the disutility undergone by one individual following the performance of a task in an unfavourable situation may lead to wage compensation. In accordance with this simple description of the wage determination process, variables reflective of the productivity of the workers and their working conditions have been added to our model. These include 7
indicators showing the highest level of education; prior potential experience, its square and its cube; seniority within the current company and its square; a dummy variable controlling for entrants, i.e. individuals with no seniority; the number of hours paid; a dummy for extra paid hours; 22 occupational dummies; 3 dummies for the type of contract; an indicator showing whether the individual is paid a bonus for shift work, night-time and/or weekend work and a dichotomic variable showing whether the individual supervises other workers.
Moreover, in order to control for gender and regional wage differentials, which are well documented in the literature (e.g. Farber and Newman, 1989; OECD, 2002) , we have also included a dummy for the sex of the individual and 2 regional dummies indicating whether the establishment is located. Finally, in line with recent labour market theories, supporting the existence of an effect of the employer's characteristics on wages, the size of the establishment and 2 dummies showing the level of wage bargaining have also been inserted in our regression.
The results relative to this new specification are presented in the third column of Table III . We find that the wage-profit elasticity is still significant at the 1% level but that its magnitude decreases from 0.074 to 0.036. As a result, Lester's (1952) range of pay due to rent sharing drops from 48% to 23%. Let us also notice that the inclusion of individual and firm characteristics has a substantial impact on the explanatory power of the model. Indeed, the adjusted R² reaches now almost 70%.
In sum, results suggest that the positive and significant relationship between wages and profits does not derive from an omitted variable bias. Yet, the absence of specific control variables for the sectoral affiliation of the workers may be problematic.
Industry Wage Differentials
The empirical debate about the causes of earnings inequalities was reopened at the end of the 1980s by an article by Krueger and Summers (1988) . The authors showed that wage disparities persisted in the US among workers with apparently identical individual characteristics and working conditions, employed in different sectors. Since then, similar results have been obtained for numerous industrialised countries (e.g. Goux and Maurin, 1999 , Hartog et al., 1997 , Rycx, 2002 , Vainiomäki and Laaksonen, 1995 . In light of this literature, it could be argued that rent sharing is simply reflective of industry wage premiums. In other words, it is possible that the positive correlation between wages and profits is generated by sectoral shocks rather than by the division of firms' rents. For this reason, 149 dummy variables indicating the sectoral affiliation of the workers have been added to our model. The results of this new specification are presented in column (4) of Table III . As expected, we find that sectors have a significant impact on the wage-profit elasticity. Indeed, the coefficient on profits drops from 0.036 in Model 3 to 0.029 in the current frame. However, rent sharing is still significant at the 1% level and the adjusted R² reaches now more than 70%. Moreover, from Appendix II, it can be seen that all other coefficients have the expected sign and that the vast majority of them are significant at the 5% level.
Endogeneity of Profits
Although Model 4 seems quite accurate, it is still suffering from a serious problem, namely the endogeneity of profits. Indeed, by construction, wages have a negative impact on profits.
Therefore, previous OLS estimates are not only biased but also inconsistent. To bypass this problem, we estimated Model 4 using the method of instrumental variables. This method consists in findings instruments, which are at the same time highly correlated with the endogenous variable and uncorrelated with the error term. We used as instruments for profits all the variables contained in Model 4, plus per capita firm level value added and per capita total amount of goods and services purchased by the firm. Results of our 2SLS regression are presented in the last column of degrees of freedom equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions (in this case, df = 2).
The results of this test, presented at the bottom of column 5 in Table III , show that the overidentifying restrictions can not be rejected at the level of 15%. This suggests that our instruments are valid and that Model 5 is well specified.
Our findings are significantly smaller than those reported for Belgium by Goos and Konings (2001) . Indeed, the latter report a wage-profit elasticity of around 0.10 and a
Lester's range of pay of approximately 60% of the mean wage. Nevertheless, many factors can explain these differences. Firstly, Goos and Konings only include a very limited number of control variables in their analysis, namely the ratio of white-over blue-collar workers and one digit industry dummies. Secondly, they use pooled data regressions covering the period 1987-1994, while the present study relies on a single cross-section relative to 1995. Thirdly, their data set has a larger coverage than ours. In particular, it covers the financial sector, where rent sharing is expected to be relatively high. Fourthly, they instrument profits by their lagged values when we rely on a whole set of instrumental variables including per capita firm level value added and per capita total amount of goods and services purchased by the firm. Finally, let us also notice that their dependant variable is less precise since it is constructed by dividing annual labour costs by the number of employees in the firm. Be that as it may, both studies suggest that rent sharing exists in Belgium and that a substantial part of the dispersion in wages is due to the variability in profits.
Rent Sharing for Men and Women
So far, the existence and magnitude of rent-sharing in the Belgian private sector has been investigated for all workers, independently of their sex. In this section, we analyse if the wage-profit elasticity is significantly different for male and female workers and we decompose the overall gender wage gap to determine what proportion is due rent sharing.
Wage-profit Elasticities by Gender
To investigate the interaction between rent sharing and gender, Models 4 and 5 have been estimated separately for men and women [10] . The results from this analysis are reported in Table IV and Appendix III. As mentioned previously, the OLS estimates are inconsistent because of the endogeneity of profits. Therefore, we focus on the 2SLS results [11] .
[Take in Table IV] For both sexes, we find that the coefficients on profits-per-worker are significant at the 1% level. In addition, profit effects look approximately ten percent higher for men than for women. Indeed, the wage-profit elasticity stands at 0.059 for women and at 0.066 for men. Yet, using a standard t-test, we find no significant difference between the regression coefficients of both sexes [12] . Hence, there appears to be no gender difference in remuneration from firm profits. Finally, let us notice that Lester's (1952) range of pay due to rent sharing equals respectively 38.2% and 56.2% for men and women.
Decomposition of the Gender Wage Gap
To complete our analysis, we decomposed the overall gender wage gap in order to assess what proportion is due to: (a) differences between female and male wage-profit elasticities, (b) differences by gender in the average value of firm profits-per-capita, and (c) differences by gender in all other factors, i.e. intercepts, inter-industry wage differentials, working conditions, individual and firm characteristics. To do so, we used the decomposition procedure developed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) , who showed that the difference between the average hourly wage (in logarithms) of men and women can be broken as follows:
where the indices m and f refer respectively to male and female workers, W represents the average (Naperian logarithm) of the hourly wage, ( ) L Π is the average value of firm profitsper-capita and X is a vector containing an intercept and the average values of the individual characteristics of the workers, their working conditions, their sectoral affiliation, the size of their establishment and the level of wage bargaining therein. ϑˆand λˆ are the 2SLS regression coefficients relative to ( ) L Π and X reported in Table IV and Appendix III.
Equations 6 and 7 take as a non-discriminatory wage structure that of men and women, respectively.
[Take in Table V] As shown in Table V , the overall gender wage gap, measured as the difference between mean log wages of male and female workers, stands at 0.237. This means that that the average female worker earns 76.3% of the mean male wage. Moreover, depending on the non-discriminatory wage structure used, results indicate that between 12.7% and 14.3% of the overall gender wage gap can be explained by the fact that on average women are employed in firms where profits-per-employee are lower. Table V also suggests that around 18% of the overall gender wage gap derives from differences between wage-profit elasticities for men and women. However, the latter result should be interpreted with caution because the wage-profit elasticity is not significantly different for both sexes.
Conclusion
This paper investigates, on the basis of a unique combination of two large-scale data sets, how rent sharing interacts with the gender wage gap in the Belgian private sector. Empirical findings show that individual gross hourly wages are significantly and positively related to firm profits-per-employee even when controlling for group effects in the residuals, individual and firm characteristics, industry wage differentials and endogeneity of profits.
Our instrumented wage-profit elasticity is of the magnitude 0.06 and it is not significantly different for men and women. Of the overall gender wage gap (on average women earn 23.7% less than men), results show that around 14% can be explained by the fact that on average women are employed in firms where profits-per-employee are lower. To put it differently, findings suggest that a substantial part of the gender wage gap is attributable to the segregation of women in less profitable firms. Future research concerning the magnitude of rent sharing in Belgium should rely on matched employer-employee panel data so as to control for the non observed individual characteristics of the workers. Indeed, these characteristics might modify our results if it emerged that they were not randomly distributed between firms and or sexes. Unfortunately, at the moment such data set does not exist.
Notes
1. See e.g. Pencavel (1991) .
2. Using Belgian aggregate data from 1957 to 1988, Vannetelbosch (1996) has shown that both the right-to-manage and the efficient bargaining models can be rejected in favour of the general bargaining model, developed by Manning (1987) . This means that the outcome of the bargaining process is located somewhere between the labour demand curve and the contract curve. Nevertheless, this result must be considered with caution for at least two reasons. First, the estimates are very sensitive to the specification of the reservation wage, and second, the trade union density and the number of strikes are far from ideal as a surrogate for the relative bargaining power of unions. This uncertainty is not very surprising since "the empirical literature has not yet been able to find an appropriate test to distinguish between the principal models" (Booth, 1995, pp. 141) . Also noteworthy is that, while these models have different implications for unemployment and economic welfare, they generate identical wage equations. Hence, for the sake of simplicity, we have chosen to rely on the right-to-manage model.
3. See Nickell (1999, pp. 3) for a discussion on the notation. 7. Because of its substantial impact on the standard errors of the estimates, the correction for group effects has been applied to all other models presented in this paper. 10. Because of a strong multicollinearity problem, the sector average gross hourly wage and the sector unemployment rate have been not been included in the regression.
11. Let us notice that the p-value relative to the over-identification test for the male regression equals only 0.069.
12. For the 2SLS regressions (model 5), t = 0.69. 2 Approximated by the firm annual gross operating surplus per worker. The gross operating surplus corresponds to the difference between the value added at factor costs and the total personnel expenses. This variable is expressed in thousands of BEF. 3 Sectors are defined at the Nace 2 digit level. 4 The data relative to the sectoral unemployment rate were taken from the monthly bulletin of labour statistics, published by the ONEM (1995). 5 Experience (potentially) accumulated on the labour market before the last job. It has been computed as follows: age -6 -years of education -seniority. 6 Number of workers. 7 Number of hours paid in the reference period, including overtime paid. Model 1 + correction for group effects (Greenwald (1983 ) & Moulton (1990 ).
Model 3
Model 2 + control for individual characteristics, firm size and the level of wage bargaining.
Model 4
Model 3 + control for industry wage differentials.
Model 5
Model 4 estimated by 2SLS. Instruments for profits include all variables contained in Model 4, plus per capita firm-level value added and per capita total amount of goods and services purchased by the firm. Model 6
Model 4 and 5 estimated separately for men and women. + The dependent variable is the (Naperian) logarithm of the individual gross hourly wages. t-statistics are between brackets. Standard errors have been corrected for heteroscedasticity by the method of White (1980) . **/*: coefficient significant at 1 and 5%, respectively. ° Approximated by the firm annual gross operating surplus per worker. 1 Group effects estimations use the correction for common variance components within groups proposed by Greenwald (1983) and Moulton (1990) . 2 Sex, 6 dummies for education, prior potential experience, its square and its cube, seniority within the current company and its square, a dummy for individuals with no seniority, dummy variable indicating whether the individual supervises other workers, a variable showing whether the individual received a bonus for shift work, night work and/or weekend work, a dummy for overtime paid, 3 dummies for the type of contract, 2 regional dummies and 23 occupational dummies. 3 The size of the establishment and the level of wage bargaining (2 dummies). 4 N*R'² and associated (p-value). + The dependent variable is the (Naperian) logarithm of the individual gross hourly wages. t-statistics are between brackets. Standard errors have been corrected for heteroscedasticity by the method of White (1980) . **/*: coefficient significant at 1 and 5%, respectively. ° Approximated by the firm annual gross operating surplus per worker. 1 Group effects estimations use the correction for common variance components within groups proposed by Greenwald (1983) and Moulton (1990) . 2 Sex; 6 dummies for education; prior potential experience, its square and its cube; seniority within the current company and its square, a dummy for individuals with no seniority; dummy variable indicating whether the individual supervises other workers; a variable showing whether the individual received a bonus for shift work, night work and/or weekend work, a dummy for overtime paid, 3 dummies for the type of contract, 2 regional dummies and 23 occupational dummies. 3 The size of the establishment and the level of wage bargaining (2 dummies). 4 N*R'² and associated (p-value). White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. Group effects estimations use the correction for common variance components within groups proposed by Greenwald (1983) and Moulton (1990) .
1 Approximated by the firm annual gross operating surplus per worker. 2 N*R'² and associated (pvalue). **/*/°: coefficient significant at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
Appendix III: Earnings Equations by Gender, Detailed Results

Model 4 (OLS)
Model 5 White (1980) . Group effects estimations use the correction for common variance components within groups proposed by Greenwald (1983) and Moulton (1990) .
1 Approximated by the firm annual gross operating surplus per worker. 2 N*R'² and associated (p-value).**/*/°: coefficient significant at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
